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THE SCOPE OF WASHINGTON'S BUSINESS AND
OCCUPATION TAX
For the privilege of engaging in business activities, Washington im-
poses a tax measured by the application of rates against value of
products, gross proceeds of sales, or gross income of the business, as
the case may be.1 Business is defined as including "all activities en-
gaged in with the object of gain, benefit, or advantage to the taxpayer
or to another person or class, directly or indirectly."2 This is an ex-
tremely broad base for taxation and, consequently, this tax has been
one of great interest to the legislature, especially in recent years when
it has provided considerable revenue for the state.' As will be pointed
out subsequently, the legislature has done much in keeping this tax
as controversy free as possible by modifying, clarifying, and elimin-
ating objections raised by the courts and also by incorporating desirable
decisions of the courts into the statutes. Most objections to the stat-
utes have been litigated. Therefore this tax has the advantage of being
well defined and settled as far as its basic principles are concerned.
However, it is still a frequent source of litigation because of new or
different types of businesses that are developed or enter the state4 or
because of extensions of the tax by the legislature.5
I RCW 82.04.220. The business and occupation tax is Title 82.04 of the Revised
Code of Washington (RCW).
2 RCW 82.04.140. This definition is fundamentally the same as the one enacted in
the original act of 1933, Wash. Sess. Laws 1933, c. 191, § 1 (7).
3 Since 1950 the business and occupation tax has averaged about 20% of the tax
dollar received by Washington State, State Tax Commission, Washington State
Statistical Reports, vol. 1 - 24; see also, Washington State Tax Commission, Annual
Reports.
4 Convoy Co. v. Taylor, 53 Wn.2d 439, 334 P.2d 772 (1959).
G Prior to 1959 income from rentals over thirty days and leases of real property
were not taxed under Title 82.04, Wash. Sess. Laws 1945, c. 249, § 2(1) (RCW
82.04.390). The legislature recently removed this exemption and taxed this income,
Wash. Ex. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 5, § 4. The amendment is currently being contested in
Apartment House Operators Ass'n, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 2 CCH State Tax Reporter
-Washington § 200-209 (1959). The Thurston County Superior Court in an un-
written opinion enjoined the Tax Commission from enforcing the tax as to rentals
and leases of real property. In its declaratory judgment the court held the statute vio-
lated the Washington constitution sections 3 (no person shall be deprived of, ...
property, without due process of law), 12 (privileges and immunities), 23 (no law
impairing obligation of contracts), 32, (fundamental principles are essential), and 29
(the provisions of the constitution are mandatory) of article I and also the fourteenth
amendment (all taxes shall be uniform on the same class of property; real property
is one class) and seventeenth amendment (40-mill limit) plus the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.
Of all these sections cited, the one of real importance is the fourteenth amendment
of the Washington constitution. The problem facing the supreme court (notice of
appeal filed July 16, 1959) is going to be a difficult one to decide because of past




The constitutionality of the original act was litigated soon after its
enactment. In State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle,6 a majority upheld the act
as not violating the state constitutional provision, "All taxes shall be
uniform upon the same class of property . .. "' The tax was held to
be on the privilege of acquiring income and not on the income itself;
therefore, the tax was not a property tax within the meaning of the
cited provision.8 That the measure of the tax was the amount of in-
come did not affect the principle involved. However, holding this to
be an excise tax did not completely eliminate the constitutional ques-
tion because it was then necessary to decide whether or not the classi-
fications were reasonable in light of the exemptions. The tax as origi-
nally passed taxed farmers and those rendering services, professional
and otherwise, and exempted employees; but the governor vetoed the
tax on farmers and on those rendering services, thereby exempting
these groups from the tax. The court said the fact that the mentioned
occupations were not taxed did not render the whole classification
plan invalid on the ground of unreasonableness because: 1. farming is
not a commercial pursuit; it is a way of life; 2. wage earners cannot
under any theory be classified or considered as engaging in business,"
to be a an excise tax and not a property tax within the meaning of the state's four-
teenth amendment, State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 25 P.2d 91 (1933) ;
Supply Laundry Co. v. Jenner, 178 Wash. 72, 34 P.2d 363 (1934) ; Rainier Nat'l Park
Co. v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 159, 45 P.2d 617 (1935). However, the court has also
said a tax upon rents from real estate is a tax upon the real estate itself, Jensen v.
Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 222, 53 P2d 607, 612 (1936), citing Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). The business and occupation tax will only
reach properties that produce income and therefore will not be uniform on all real
property. This exact situation has been held to violate the uniformity provision of the
fourteenth amendment of the Washington constitution regarding real estate, Jensen
v. Henneford, id. It can also be said that the allowance of excise taxes on real estate
will frustrate the intent of the uniformity clause of the fourteenth amendment and
also the 40-mill limit of the seventeenth amendment. How the court reconciles these
variant positions will be extremely important. If the court holds the tax is consti-
tutional, an effective method for avoiding the 40-mill limit will probably result. If the
tax is held unconstitutional, there is a danger of jeopardizing the foundations of the
whole business and occupation tax in that if the income is held to be property within
the meaning of the state's fourteenth amendment, it is opening the door to the whole
line of income tax cases requiring a uniform tax rate on all income, Culliton v. Chase,
174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933) ; Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash, 209, 53 P.2d 607
(1936) ; Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wn.2d 191, 235 P.2d 173 (1951) ; see generally on
the problem Annot. 103 A.L.R. 18 (1936) ; Annot. 71 A.L.R. 256 (1931).
6 174 Wash. 402, 25 P.2d 91 (1933).7 Wash. Const., amend. XIV.
8 The court apparently considered income as one class of property within the mean-
ing of the fourteenth amendment of the Washington constitution; see Culliton v.
Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933).
9 See note 2 above; The definition of business was nearly the same as it is now
and the court could make this statement only by ignoring the definition of business
in the statute and using the conventional definition as found in a dictionary.
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3. a profession is not a money getting business; its main purpose is to
be of service to the community and to those who seek aid.
Of the dissenting members of the court, two thought this was not
an excise tax, but rather a property tax, reasoning that a tax on the
privilege of receiving is equivalent to taxing the item received itself.
Then, using the theory that income is one class of property, they said
the tax must be uniform within the class as required by the state con-
stitution. All the dissenters thought that the exemption of the farmers
and others violated Article I, section 12 of the state constitution0 be-
cause the "classification ... is unreasonable and arbitrary, discriminat-
ory in its nature, and taking no thought of relative ability to pay, or
the relative enjoyment of governmental privileges conferred."'1
Though the rationale of the majority may leave something to be de-
sired, it did settle the question of the constitutionality of the tax and
was followed the next year in a case concerning certain amendments
of the act by the 1933 special session of the legislature. 2 Most criti-
cism of the rationale has not been aimed at these cases, but at the
income tax case decided within the same year where a theory consis-
tent with the dissent was adopted.' While the court has remained
faithful to the above theory in regard to the business and occupation
tax, it has been just as faithful to the theory used in the income tax
case.14 The court has not as yet had to reconcile these two theories,
but it may be forced to do so in the real property case now pending
which concerns the extension of the business tax to income from rental
and leased property.1
LIMITATIONS OF THE SCOPE
Since the business and occupation tax is so broad, the simplest
method of examining its scope is by determining that which is not
affected by the tax. There are also specific exemptions and deductions
provided; the usual problem concerns whether a given activity is
included within one of the exemptions. There are limitations imposed
by the Federal Constitution, federal statutes, and the Washington
20 "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation
other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms, shall not
equally belong to all citizens or corporations."
11 State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 422, 25 P.2d 91, 98 (1933).
12 Supply Laundry Co. v. Jenner, 178 Wash. 72, 34 P.2d 363 (1934).
Is Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash- 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933).
14 Aberdeen Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Chase, 157 Wash. 351, 289 Pac. 536 (1930);
Culliton v. Chase, note 13 mura; Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607
(1936) ; Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wn.2d 191, 235 P.2d 173 (1951).
15 See note 5 .slpra.
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constitution. This is an over simplification since these areas overlap
to a large degree and there are also certain areas that do not quite fit
these classifications; however, it is easier to reconcile the cases and
understand the main problems if these general areas are kept in mind.
Exemptions. There are comparatively few specific exemptions
provided for by statute"8 or by rule of the Washington State Tax
Commission." The majority of the statutory exemptions are self-
explanatory; however, a few have been troublesome and warrant
discussion.
The business and occupation tax does not apply to farmers except as
to sales made at retail.'" The exemption does not extend to sales of
animals or parts thereof by stockyards or slaughter or packing
houses, nor does it apply to associations, whether mutual, co-operative
or otherwise engaging in any business activity with respect to which
tax liability is imposed." This latter section was inserted after the
first Yakima Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Henneford case,2" which held a
fruit packing, processing, warehousing and selling co-operative corpor-
ation was the agent of its farmer-stockholders and therefore within the
exemption given to farmers. The amendment was interpreted as elimi-
noting the exemption of farmer co-operatives by a majority of the
court in the second Yakima Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Henneford case,2'
but the dissent felt the amendment did not disturb the holding of the
previous case since the "agency principle" was not affected by the
amendment."8 The agency problem will be discussed more fully later.
id RCW 82.04.300 to 82.04.420 as amended by Wash. Ex. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 5.
17 Excise Tax Division of the Tax Commission of the State of Washington, Rules
Relating to the Revenue Act of 1935, (1956). New rules are now being prepared, but
as of the date of this writing, had not been issued. All references to these rules herein
will be as follows: Excise Tax Rule -.
The Tax Commission is not authorized to provide exemptions as such, but they do
incorporate in the rules the decisions of the Washington supreme court and the
United States Supreme Court which hold the tax cannot be applied to certain busi-
nesses, activities, or portions thereof. For a good discussion of the Tax Commission's
rule making power, see Washington Printing & Binding Co. v. State, 192 Wash. 448,
73 P.2d 1326 (1937).
is See the definition of "Sale at retail," Wash. Ex. Sess. Laws 1959 c. 5 § 2 (RCW
82.04.050). Sales of feed, seed, fertilizer, and spray materials to persons for the pur-
pose of producing any agricultural product are not included within the meaning of
the term.
19 RCW 82.04.330.
20 182 Wash. 437, 47 P.2d 831 (1935).
21187 Wash. 252, 60 P.2d 62 (1936), 100 A.L.R. 439 (1936).
22 Not all amounts received by a co-operative association are currently included in
its gross receipts. RCW 82.04.430 allows the deduction from the measure of tax
amounts derived by any person as compensation for the receiving, washing, sorting,
and packing of fresh perishable horticultural products and the materials and supplies
used therein when performed for the persons exempted in RCW 82.04.330 (farmers),
either as an agent or as an independent contractor.
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The business tax does not apply to any person in respect to his em-
ployment in the capacity of an employee or servant as distinguished
from that of an independent contractor." This particular section has
provoked much litigation. Whether a person is an "employee,"
"'agent," or "independent contractor" is strictly a factual question
that must be decided on an individual basis. An exemption in a statute
imposing a tax is strictly construed in favor of the application of the
tax and against the person claiming the exemption. 4 The Tax Com-
mission has developed a comprehensive rule for determining whether
a person is an employee.2" The rule states that an "employee" is an
individual whose entire compensation is fixed at a certain rate or at a
certain percentage of business obtained by such employee payable in
all events; one who has no direct income or profits other than a wage
or commission and incurs no liability for expenses of maintaining an
office or place of business; one whose conduct with respect to service
rendered, obtaining of, or transacting business is supervised or con-
trolled by the employer. A corporation, joint venture, or any group of
individuals acting as a unit, is not an employee or servant. Also, the
fact that a person is considered an employee or servant under the State
Unemployment Compensation Act or the Federal Social Security Act,
does not conclusively establish that such person is an employee within
the provisions of the business tax; but where a person is not considered
an employee under these acts, such person will not be considered an
employee under the business tax. This last section illustrates that there
are varying definitions of "employee" depending on the context and
purpose of the statute, and the definition used in other situations may
not be helpful when considering the business and occupation tax.2
The Tax Commission rule is extremely narrow in its definition and it
may be possible to fail to comply with every section and still be an
employee within the exemption, but the burden will be on the person
asserting he is within the exemption.2
The question of whether a person is an employee is occasionally
raised in a slightly differenit context. The argument seems to be that
a person is not "engaging in business" within the meaning of the
29 RCW 82.04.360.
2 4 Yaklima Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Henneford, 187 Wash. 252, 60 P.2d (1936).
215Excise Tax Rule 105:
26 For example, in Empey v. Yost, 182 Wash. 17, 44 P.2d 774 (1935), the court
defined "county employee!' very broadly since the statute under consideration was
remedial in -nature.-
27 Excise Tax Rule 105.
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statute because he is an "employee." This raises a slightly different
problem which is discussed separately below.
Closely related in effect to the exemptions are the deductions pro-
vided in the statute." Since these deductions are self-explanatory,
they will not be discussed. They are important, however, and should
always be considered because of the broad applicability of a few of
them.
Engaging in Business Limitations. As was pointed out earlier, the
definition of "business" is very broad. "Engaging in business" is de-
fined as meaning the commencing, conducting, or continuing in busi-
ness; the exercise of corporate or franchise powers; and liquidating
a business when the liquidators thereof hold themselves out to the
public as conducting such business.2" The fact that there is only in-
termittent or occasional sales does not mean a person is not "engaging
in business" within the meaning of this chapter.2 "
A possible argument is that a person is an agent for another and
therefore not engaging in business himself. This is not quite the same
argument as where one is asserting that he is an employee; it is a shift-
ing of tax liability to another rather than avoidance altogether."' The
agency theory seemed to be the basis of the holding in the first Yakima
Fruit Ass'n case"2 discussed earlier, and was the ground for the dissent
in the second Yakima Fruit Ass'n case." This argument was used later
in two different situations and apparently rejected. " In the Peninsula
Light Co. case the court distinguished the rationale of the first Yakima
Fruit Ass'n case by saying that in that case the co-operative members
acted as agents for themselves in processing and selling, while in the
case at bar the co-operative bought power wholesale and resold to
members and this was an activity engaged in with the object of gain,
benefit or advantage either direct or indirect within the meaning of
the statute. The weakness of this statement is that it does not explain
28 RCW 82.04.430.
29 RCW 82.04.150.
30 Milwaukee Land Co. v. State, 188 Wash. 52, 61 P.2d 996 (1936) ; according to
Excise Tax Rule 106, one sale by a manufacturer or wholesaler of an article manufac-
tured or handled by him is sufficient to bring him within the business and occupation
tax. This does not apply to "casual" sales-sales by a person not engaged in selling
that type article, RCW 82.04.040.
31 See RCW 82.04.480. This problem is sometimes raised by a slightly different
approach-who is receiving the gross income from the activity? While this raises
additional considerations, the main rationale is much the same. See Jacobs v. State,
42 Wn.2d 565, 256 P.2d 838 (1953), 102 A.L.R. 768.
32 182 Wash. 437, 47 P.2d 831 (1935).
38 187 Wash. 252, 60 P.2d 62 (1936).
34 Peninsula Light Co. v. Tax Comm., 185 Wash. 669, 56 P.2d 720 (1936) ; Fisher-
men's Cooperative Ass'n v. State, 198 Wash. 413, 88 P.2d 593 (1939).
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why the association was not the agent of its members when buying
the power; this is simply a sidestepping of the argument and does not
answer it. It is difficult to reconcile the court's holding that a fruit
co-operative that sells for its members does so without expecting gain
or advantage with its later holding that a co-operative light company
that buys for its members at wholesale and resells at only high enough
rates to cover actual expenses does so with the expectation of gain or
advantage. The possible justification of this case is that the first
Yakima Fruit Ass'n case was wrong in its application and interpreta-
tion of the statute. The words "person"? and "company" are used inter-
changeably in this chapter and "company" now specifically includes
co-operatives; 5 therefore, since the statute taxes every person engag-
ing in business, the co-operative should be taxed since it is a business
as defined by the statute." In the Fishermen's Cooperative case the
argument was again raised and this time the court seemed to indicate
the association had not established the agency relationship under its
burden of proof. It seemed to ignore much of the rationale of the
Peninsula Light Co. case. The cases have left the validity of the agency
argument in confusion. However, the later cases seem to indicate the
court is going to be strict and to limit the application of the theory
if it applies it at all.
The burden of proof was a problem again in Northern Pac. Coast
Freight Bureau v. State,"7 where the taxpayer contended it was not
engaging in business within the provision of the statute because its
employees were agents and employees of the -railroads. The Bureau
was maintained as a separate office, complete with a large staff, and
published the rates of the member railroads. The expenses, including
salaries, were divided among the railroads who paid their respective
shares monthly. The court felt that the staff did not come within the
meaning of "employee" as used in the statute, but that the record
supported the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff was "engaging
in business." The court pointed out the several separate entity aspects
of the plaintiff. The Tax Commission has incorporated some of the
points of this case in Excise Tax Rule 105 which defines persons en-
gaging in business: "A person engaging in business is generally one
holds himself out to the public as ... [in a business] ... ;" (In the
Northern case- this was certainly the situation-the action was even
35 RCW 82.04.030.
so See definition of "business" in the first paragraph of this Comment.
87 12 Wn.2d 563, 122 P.2d 467 (1942).
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brought in the Bureau's own name); "one to whom gross income of
the business inures; one upon whom liability for losses lies or who
bears the expense of conducting a business; one, generally, acting in
an independent capacity, whether or not subject to immediate control
and supervision by a superior"; (this was the situation in the Northern
case); "or one who acts as an employer and has employees subject to
his control and supervision." (This is doubtful; for instance, many
foremen have the power of hiring and firing and are definitely not
employers; it should be noted, however, that in the Northern case,
the manager could hire and fire. Probably the most that should be said
is that this is one factor to consider.)
The "engaging in business" concept has several facets. As was
mentioned earlier, it is sometimes argued that a person is not engaging
in business because he is an employee. This should not be an "engag-
ing in business" problem because a reading of the definition of "busi-
ness" would seem to include an employee within its sweep." How-
ever, a reading of the cases concerning this exemption discloses
language that seems to indicate an employee is not within the sweep
of the term "business."'" This language ignores the definition of the
term by the statute and also needlessly confuses the issues. An em-
ployee escapes tax because of a specific exemption, rather than because
he is not "engaging in business." The question of whether a person
is an employee should be considered independently of the question
whether a person is engaging in business. These two questions require
different approaches since they can so often apply to divergent situ-
ations. The approach to the problem of shifting liability for tax to an-
other was discussed above and illustrates that affirmative conduct is
essential to constitute "engaging in business." To come within the
employee exemption, as was pointed out earlier, the court seems to
consider actions that are not done.
The "engaging in business" concepts become important again in de-
88 See note 36 supra.
39 The Northern Pac. Coast Freight Bureau case, note 37 supra, is the best illustra-
tion of this indication. See also, Yakima Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Henneford, note 21
supra; Cary v. City of Bellingham, 41 Wn.2d 468, 250 P.2d 114 (1952). (This case is
a license case, but it does indicate somewhat the court's attitude in regard to wage
earners). The base of the whole problem stems from State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle,
note 6 supra, where, as was earlier pointed out, the court said an employee could not
be understood as engaging in business; the court ignored the definition of business
completely. The problem facing the court was the constitutionality of the exemptions(employees were exempted) and in light of these exemptions, whether the classifica-
tions were reasonable. The statement the court made concerning employees was un-
necessary for the holding; however, the idea seems to persist that the dictionary defi-
nition of business is the one to use and not the statutory definition.
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ciding whether or not an out of state business is engaging in business
in this state. In this aspect the concept is similar, but not equivalent
to "doing business" as this term is used in the due process context."
Doing business problems arise from different situations and more may
be required in one than in another. 1 In regard to the business and
occupation tax, if a person contracts with another to manufacture an
item in Washington and furnishes some of the parts, maintains an
agent for collecting payments, maintains bank accounts in this state,
and frequently visits to inspect the work of the contractor, he will be
deemed to be engaging in business in this state within the meaning of
the statute and will be taxed on the proceeds of sales earned within
the state even though the contracts for the selling of the items were
made out of the state and there has been no solicitation within this
state.4 It is doubtful whether continuous solicitation of sales or con-
tracts subject to approval without the state would be sufficient to con-
stitute engaging in business,"3 but it probably would not take much
more positive action-such as maintaining an office, or warehouse."
This is really a due process limitation and not so much a limitation of
the statute itself. There are no cases discussing the amount of activity
that a foreign business has to do before it becomes liable under this
act because of limitations of the act itself. The probable reason for
this is the fact that the foreign organizations have not argued the point
but rather have relied on the constitutional limitations of the due pro-
cess clause and the commerce clause.
nIuITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
There are several limitations outside of the business and occupation
tax that restrict its scope. These fall into two general categories;
limitations by the Federal Constitution and federal statutes and,
limitations by the Washington constitution. To a certain extent these
areas overlap one another due to similarities in the two constitutions.
The most frequent area of litigation in regard to the business and
occupation tax concerns the commerce clause of the Federal Consti-
4 0 Thys v. State, 31 Wn.2d 739, 199 P.2d 68 (1948).4 1 United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948) (whether
there was a sufficient "doing of business" for service of process under the Clayton
Act) ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (whether there
was a sufficient amount of "doing business" for a state to have jurisdiction to tax) ;
American Nat'l Red Cross v. Department of Labor & Indus., 166 Wash. 488, 7 P.2d 577
(1932) (whether there was a "doing of business" within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act).
42 See note 40 supra.
43 See note 40 supra, at 768.
44 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 22 Wn2d 146, 154 P2d 801, aff'd 326 U.S.
310 (1945) ; see also, Excise Tax Rule 193.
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tution; 5 "however, a discussion of this limitation is beyond the scope
of this article. There are other limitations by the Federal Constitution;
the due process clause,46 the equal protection clause,47 the import-
export clause,48 and the disability placed on a state to tax the prop-
erty of the federal government.49
Limitation by the Due Process Clause. The due process clause
has not been too great a limiting factor on the business and occupation
tax. It is hornbook law that a state is prevented from taxing outside
its jurisdiction by the due process clause. 0 This tax by its terms and
definitions is concerned with local activity and does not attempt as
a general rule to tax out of state activities.5 ' As to the classifications
of extracting, manufacturing, processing for hire, printing and pub-
lishing, there is seldom any due process argument since these are local
activities by nature even though the product is sold exclusively in
interstate or foreign commerce." However, in the recent case of Crown
Zellerbach v. State53 it was argued that the commerce clause and the
due process clause required apportionment of the value of products
manufactured in this state because this value included within its
measure the value of executive functions which were performed out
of state. The Washington court rejected this argument, seemingly
treating such items as incidental to the actual manufacturing process
itself and saying that the measure substantially reflected the value of
the products manufactured. This seems a decision based on necessity
as it would be nearly impossible to apportion such values on anything
but a strictly arbitrary basis.
45 U.S. Const, art. I, § 8.
46 U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1.
47 U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. This has been interpreted by the Washington
supreme court as being essentially equivalent to the Washington constitution's privi-
lege and immunities clause, note 90 infra, and the two provisions are discussed to-
gether later.
48 U.S.Const., art. I, § 10.
49 Union Pac. R.R. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 5 (1873).
50 Concessions Co. v. Morris, 109 Wash. 46, 186 Pac. 655 (1919) (an interesting
case discussing the geographical aspects).
51 For example, see RCW 82.04.460. "Any person rendering services and maintaining
places of business both within and without this state shall, for the purpose of comput-
ing tax liability under this chapter, apportion to this state that portion of his gross
income which is derived from services rendered within this state. Where such appor-
tionment cannot be accurately made by separate accounting methods, the taxpayer
shall apportion to this state that proportion of his total income which the cost of doing
business within the state bears to the total cost of doing business within and without
the state."
52 Excise Tax Rule 193; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932)
(manufacturing) ; Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923) (extracting)
Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927) (extracting).
55 53 Wn.2d 813, 328 P.2d 884 (1958), appeal denied-U.S.-, 3 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1959).
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Some problem with due process occurs in the sales area-both whole-
sale and retail. The statute has a specific limitation apparently intended
to meet this,"4 but it is of little practical help. The basic or minimum
amount of business necessary for jurisdiction to tax out-of-state ven-
dors is probably the standard set in International Shoe Co. v. Henne-
ford:" continuous solicitation with some maintaining of offices or
showrooms. The due process argument seems to be submerged quite
often in the arguments concerning interstate commerce;"0 this may be
due to a use of discretion by the Tax Commission in not attempting to
collect taxes from businesses where due process alone might be suffi-
cient to defeat the particular case. Also, as was pointed out earlier, if
a person is engaging in business within the meaning of the statute, it
is more likely that due process requirements have been met.
Limitations on the Taxing of Federal Property and Agents.
Related to the due process argument and its jurisdiction to tax prob-
lems is the question of the taxing of businesses conducted on federally
owned land or of transactions with the federal government. The fed-
eral government is exempt from tax on its properties and from tax on
its activities unless Congress permits such taxation." However, the
mere doing business with the federal government does not make a
private person or company the government's agent and thus immune
from taxation. 8
In this area, a close examination must always be made of the under-
lying laws and documents-contracts, laws whereby land is ceded to
5 RCW 82.04.430(6) provides for the deduction from the measure of tax, "Amounts
derived from business which the state is prohibited from taxing under the Constitution
of this state or the Constitution or laws of the United States."
Gu See note 44, sura; Excise Tax Rule 193 exempts sales where the property is
shipped directly from outside the state to the purchaser:
1) when the order is sent by an out-of-state office of the seller directly to the
purchaser at a point outside the state;
2) when the order is sent by the Washington customer directly to the seller at
a point outside the state; or
3) when the order is solicited in this state by an agent of the seller and for-
warded to the seller for acceptance at a point outside this state; provided, there
is and there has been no participation whatsoever in the transaction by the seller's
branch office, local outlet, or other local place of business; or by an agent of the
seller having or having had any connection with any branch office; a franchise or
credit investigation of a prospective purchaser and/or recommendation or approval
by such local office is such utilization of the local offices to render subsequent
transaction taxable.
5( For example, see Crown Zellerbach v. State, note 53 supra.
57 See note 49 supra.
us Thomson v. Union Pac. R.R., 76 U.S. (8 Wall.) 579 (1870) ; Federal Compress
& Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934) ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 240 U.S. 319 (1916) ; Rainier Nat! Park Co. v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 159, 45
P.2d 617 (1935) ; see also, Annot. 56 A.L.R. 587 (1928).
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the federal government, enabling acts, and federal statutes on the
subject. In the 1919 Washington case of Concession Co. v. Morris,"9
the court examined the act of Congress and the act of the Washington
legislature whereby Fort Lewis was established and the land ceded.
The Washington legislature had ceded all rights over the property
except for service of process. Therefore, the court concluded, Pierce
County, where Fort Lewis is located, could not tax the personal prop-
erty of a concessionaire doing business on Fort Lewis when he was not
domiciled in Pierce County. The court reserved the question whether
King County, the concessionaire's domicile, could tax.
In Neak Bay Fish Co. v. Krummel ° the court examined the Indian
treaties and enabling act involved to see what protection from taxation
a person who was not an Indian but was doing business on an Indian
reservation might have. Under the particular facts, it was concluded
that the company had no immunity and it was liable for the business
and occupation tax. This case seems to reject the theory discussed in
the Concession Co. case that because of a particular law, a particular
piece of real estate is now without the physical jurisdiction of a state
and only surrounded by the state. That theory was unrealistic in the
first place since it is difficult to say a particular plot of ground is not
within the physical jurisdiction for one purpose-taxation-but is for
another-service of process. Such a theory introduces due process
concepts into an area where they should have no application. The true
problem concerns the construction of agreements, exemptions and
other aspects of statutes. This is made clear by the case of Rainier
Nat'l Park Co. v. Martin6 where the court rejected the argument that
the business and occupation tax statute taxing businesses "within the
State" was intended to exclude a business in a national park located
within the state. The court said "within the State" meant within the
geographical limits of the state and that the park was clearly within
these limits. The court then proceeded to hold the corporation liable
for the business and occupation tax since the ceding act of the Wash-
ington legislature and the accepting statute of Congress reserved to
Washington the right to tax concessionaires.62
59 See note 50 supra.
60 3 Wn.2d 570, 101 P.2d 600 (1940).
6118 F. Supp. 481, aff'd 302 U.S. 661 (1937).
62 In an earlier case, Rainier Nat'l Park Co. v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 159, 45 P.2d
617 (1935), apparently no argument was made that the state had reserved the right
to tax persons having franchises in the park. The case rested solely on the ground that
the Rainier Co. was a private corporation doing business for profit under a contract
with the federal government and was not an instrumentality of the federal govern-
ment. The court seemed to assume the park was "within the state" for the purpose of
[VOL. 35
BUSINESS AND OCCUPATION TAX
The case law of part of the area under discussion was reviewed in
Ryan v. State 3 and the following rules were deduced by the court from
the cases respecting jurisdiction over lands acquired by the federal
government for public purposes:
1) When the land is acquired for one of the purposes within Article
I, section 8, clause 16 of the Federal Constitution," by purchase with
consent of the state, federal jurisdiction is exclusive in such area for
all purposes.
2) When the land is acquired for one of the purposes within that
clause, but other than by purchase with the consent of the state, the
federal jurisdiction is exclusive only to the extent of the purposes for
which the land is held.
3) When the land is acquired for a purpose not within the clause,
but by purchase with consent of the state, when the United States has
jurisdiction over the land as may be ceded to it by the state.
4) When land is acquired for a purpose not within that clause, in
any manner other than by purchase with the consent of the state, then
the United States holds the land just as any other proprietor does,
except that the land may not be taxed by the state.
The court then held, after examining the relevant acts of Congress
and of the Washington legislature, that the construction of Grand
Coulee dam and its related projects did not fall exclusively into any
of the above categories so as to give the United States exclusive juris-
diction over the land, but rather was in a class where several purposes
were intermingled so as to call for the exercise of jurisdiction by both
federal and state authorities according to their respective interests.
Therefore, Washington could apply its business and occupation tax
to proceeds received by the contractor.
The above cited classifications are one type of argument used in
certain situations. Another argument commonly urged in the above
and also in other situations is much broader and does not concern
federally owned real estate. The theory is that a particular company
or person is an "agent" or "instrumentality" of the federal government
taxation under the business and occupation tax. The case also points out the business
and occupation tax is not only a property tax, it is also not a license tax; it is not
imposed as a prerequisite to entering into or for the regulation of business, but solely
for revenue purposes.
63 188 Wash. 115, 61 P.2d 1276 (1936).
64 Congress shall have power: "To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases what-
soever, over such district... as may, by cession of particular States, and the accept-
ance by congress, become the seat of government of the United States; and to exer-
cise like authority over all places purchased, by the consent of the legislature of the
State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-
yards, and other needful buildings;... "
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and therefore immune from taxation." Again reference must be made
to documents-usually acts of Congress authorizing the actions and
specific contracts. If Congress has expressly provided for the exemp-
tion of private contractors from state taxes, there is no problem. It is
a question of statutory construction whether a tax exemption specifi-
cally given by Congress to a federal agency is broad enough to include
independent contractors hired by the federal agency.6 Absent such
Congressional action, the argument that a private business is exempt
from state taxation because it is an "instrumentality" or "agent" of
the federal government has had comparatively little success in Wash-
ington,67 unless there is a specific provision in the contract between
the United States and the private contractor that the latter is an
"agent" of the United States for specific or all purposes."
A reading of the cases69 would seem to indicate there might be a
situation where an independent contractor maintained such special
relations with the government under a contract that the contractor
would be immune from state taxation; there seems to be no case so
holding however. If such an immunity does exist, it is because the tax
interferes with the federal government in carrying out its functions."
State gross income taxes on receipts received under a federal contract
have been held not to be an interference with the federal government,7
though a real property tax payable by a private manufacturer meas-
ured by the improved value of land was such an interference when
65 Silas Mason, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 188 Wash. 98, 61 P.2d 1269 (1936);
Rainier Nat'l Park Co. v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 159, 45 P.2d 617 (1935).
66 Carsen v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1951). In this case the court
construed the state tax exemption given the Atomic Enegry Commission by the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 as including private corporations acting as independent contractors
or agents of the Commission mainly on the ground that the Act authorized the Com-
mission to use private firms in carrying out its functions.
On the basis of this case, the Supreme Court in a per curiarn decision reversed the
Washington courts decision holding General Electric liable for business and occupation
taxes arising from income received for the construction and operation of the Hanford
Atomic Works, General Elec. v. State, 42 Wn.2d 411, 256 P.2d (1953), reild per
curiam 347 U.S. 909 (1953).
67 Rainier Nat'l Park Co. v. Henneford, note 65 supra; Silas Mason, Inc. v. State
Tax Comm., note 65 supra; Rainier Nat'l Park Co. v. State, note 61 supra; DuPont
de Nemours & Co. v. State, 44 Wn.2d 339, 267 P.2d 667 (1954).
68 DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. State, note 67 supra; under one clause of the con-
tract with the United States, DuPont was expressly designated an agent of the federal
government for the purpose of collecting rents on government-owned property. How-
ever, in no other respect was this provided for though it was apparently considered by
the parties in discussions with the Washington Tax Commission. The court held the
business and occupation tax applied to all proceeds received from the federal govern-
ment except those held as agent for the government.
69 See note 61 supra.
70 United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
71 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
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the measure of tax included machinery owned by the United States."
An underlying current in the cases in this area seems to indicate that
if the federal government wanted immunity from taxation for those
with whom it contracts, it should make itself clear and provide for it
specifically."8 This may explain why the courts hold taxation of the
contractor is not such an interference or burden on the government
even though the economic burden does rest eventually on the govern-
ment.
Limitation by the Import-Export Clause. The import-export clause
of the Federal Constitution5 provides a limitation on the states' power
to tax closely analagous to the commerce clause. So long as the im-
ported article does not become commingled with the mass of property
in the state, it is exempt from taxation. 5 It loses this exemption only
when sold, or when it is taken from its original package and exposed
for sale. 77 Following these general rules, the Tax Commission in Ex-
cise Tax Rule 193 states that a deduction for sales of imports will be
allowed if the goods are in the original and unbroken package but
disallows deduction if the original package has been broken, if the
sale is by someone other than the original importer or his agent, if the
sale was after the goods had been placed in use in this state for the
purpose for which they were imported, or if the imports have been
processed or handled within the state .7  The rule permits the deduc-
72 See note 70 supra; but see City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America, 355 U.S.
489 (1958).
73 See note 71 supra; DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. State, note.67 supra.
74 See note 70 supra.
75 U.S. Const., art. I, § 10: "No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay
any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for its inspection laws.... "
76 Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 266 (1827).
77 Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506 (1923) ; Waring v. Mayor of Mobile,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 342 (1869) ; Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945);
Washington Chocolate Co. v. King County, 21 Wn.2d 630, 152 P2d 981 (1944).
78 The last part of this rule was developed in cases concerning fish caught on the
high seas. In Booth Fisheries Corp. v. Case, 182 Wash. 392, 47 P.2d 834 (1935), the
court held that fish caught in the Pacific Ocean beyond the territorial limits of the
state are imports when brought into the state; therefore, the fishermen catching the
fish were not liable for a "catch" tax. In the later case of Fishermen's Co-operative
Ass'n v. State, 198 Wash. 413, 88 P.2d 593 (1939), the state taxed the plaintiff under
the business and occupation tax measuring its income by the total sales made. One
argument advanced was that these fish were imports and therefore the importer was
immune from tax. All of the fish were cleaned and iced on the high seas and were re-
iced upon landing. Some were then mild cured in Seattle before being shipped out of
state, but most were only re-iced. The court held that the sales to customers in Wash-
ington were taxable (the balance was in interstate commerce and not taxable) because
the fish had lost their distinctive character as imports and had become, through pro-
cessing, handling and sale, a part of the common property of the state. The court
followed the similar case of Gulf Fisheries v. McInerney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928). Both
cases had factual situations where part of the fish were definitely processed-removing
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tion of sales of exports if the seller agrees to and does deliver the goods
to the buyer at a foreign destination, delivers to a carrier consigned
to a foreign destination, or delivers to the buyer at shipside or aboard
the buyer's vessel or other transportation under circumstances where
it is clear the goods will be taken to a foreign destination.
The problem area of the import-export clause in relation to the
business and occupation tax centers around activities necessary or
related to imports and exports-the providing of docking facilities,
stevedoring, transporting to and from docks and the like. The United
States Supreme Court currently uses the remoteness test-is the activ-
ity too "remote" to constitute the commencing or continuing of im-
portation or exportation?79The Tax Commission uses the test of
whether the tax is a direct burden on such commerce.8" The Washing-
ton court has used both tests, as is noted below. The revenue received
for the actual unloading and loading of ships is not subject to the busi-
ness and occupation tax; however, the business of supplying long-
shoremen for such purposes is subject to tax.8 The fine line in this
area was drawn by the Washington court in Port of Port Angeles v.
Henneford.82 In that case the court held that earnings of a dock com-
pany for transporting goods from the end of the ship's tackle to rail-
way cars or trucks, or the reverse situation, was an operation in for-
eign commerce and not taxable; but the warehousing or storage
revenues were taxable even though the storage was only temporary
while awaiting transportation. The brokerage business is too "remote,
indirect, and incidental" to be within the protection of the import-
export clause.83 The Tax Commission in Excise Tax Rule 193 exempts
the following activities because of the import-export clause: activities
involving the actual transportation of goods; solicitation of freight
heads and bones, or mild curing. However, neither court distinguished between the
fish so processed and those fish that were simply re-iced, a necessary preserving
process. It would seem that to allow seaboard states to tax merely because of the re-
icing and unloading would offend the spirit of the import-export clause.
79 Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511 (1951). In this case the court held a gross
receipts tax on a railroad shuttling goods between Baltimore's marine terminals and
the rail yards of other railroads in the city was valid. The activity was "too remote"
to constitute the commencing or continuing of importation or exportation within the
meaning of the import-export clause. The court seemed to indicate importation or
exportation began or ended at the water's edge.
80 Excise Tax Rule 193; this test was used in Port of Port Angeles v. Henneford,
193 Wash. 229, 74 P.2d 1025 (1938) ; see also, Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson,
258 U.S. 290 (1922) ; 20 A.L.R.2d 152.
81 Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937).
82 193 Wash. 229, 74 P.2d 1025 (1938).
83 Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 193 Wash. 451, 75 P.2d 1017, rev'd
on other grounds 305 U.S. 434 (1939), 20 A.L.R.2d 152; see also, Excise Tax Rule 193.
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and selling of tickets for foreign commerce; commissions received by
brokers for foreign sales paid to out-of-state independent agents.
LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION
The Washington constitution also imposes some limitations. 4 There
is, however, no Washington constitutional rule against double taxation
with regard to excise taxes.8 5 The constitutional provision exempting
from taxation the property of municipal corporations 8 does not apply
to excise taxes on a city's business type activities; therefore, cities
are businesses within the scope of the business and occupation tax
and their income from water systems, light and power companies,
street railways, and other similar activities is taxable.8 7 As was pointed
out earlier, the business and occupation tax is an excise tax and not
a property tax, and therefore is not subject to the constitutional re-
quirement of having a uniform rate on the same class of property. 8
One of the most important limitations of the business and occupation
tax is that imposed by the privilege and immunities clause of the
Washington constitution."9 Since in effect it is substantially identical
to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution," the two provisions will be considered
together. The equal protection clause requires that the classifiication
by a legislature not be arbitrary, but rather based on real and sub-
stantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation.9' It does not forbid discrimination with respect
to things that are different.92 Under the state and federal constitutions
a reasonable ground must exist for making a distinction between those
84 This discussion will be limited to those provisions of the constitution that limit
the substantive provisions of a statute, and will not be concerned with such articles as
Art. II § 9 which prohibits one bill embracing more than one subject. These technical
provisions have been used to strike down tax legislation and one should always be
aware of them; however, such provisions do not strictly concern tax questions, so
will not be discussed here.
85 Supply Laundry v. Jenner, 178 Wash. 72, 34 P.2d 363 (1934) ; Golden Age Brew-
eries, Inc. v. Henneford, 193 Wash. 536, 76 P.2d 598 (1938), 173 A.L.R. 1391.8 Wash. Const, art VII, § 2.
87 Tacoma v. State Tax Comm'n, 177 Wash. 604, 33 P.2d 899 (1934) ; see also, Note,
10 WASH. L. Rxv. 116 (1935).
88 See note 6 srpra; see also note 5 supra.
8 9 Wash. Const, art I, § 12; "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class
of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon
the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations."90 Texas Co. v. Cohn, 8 Wn.2d 360, 112 P.2d 522 (1941) ; State v. Hart, 125 Wash.
520, 217 Pac. 45 (1923) ; see also Seattle v. Dencker, 58 Wash. 501, 108 Pac. 1086(1910) (the court seemed to assume the two clauses were identical in effect).
91 Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1927).92 Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. City of Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934) ; Power,
Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wn.2d 191, 235 P2d 173 (1951).
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who are brought within the class and those who are excluded there-
from."
The real problem facing a court in applying the above rules is de-
ciding what grounds the legislature may use for classification. It has
been suggested that it is sufficient if the classification is reasonably
founded in the purposes and policy of taxation." This may be the
theory behind the Washington court's statement that the legislature
has broader discretion and greater power in making classifications for
taxation than it has for regulation." Washington has held that classi-
fication on the basis of form of doing business is unreasonable and
violates the federal and state constitutions."6 An exception to this
rule, however, is when there is discrimination between municipal and
private corporations competing in the same type of business.97 The
Washington court upheld in Benjamin Franklin Thrift Stores v. Hen-
neford" the wholesale functions act which taxed as wholesalers and
retailers those retailers who operated several outlets and supplied them
from central warehouses. The act was aimed at chain stores that did
not use local wholesalers for supply. The argument was advanced that
this was an unreasonable discrimination between such modes of oper-
ation and those where there were warehouses in the same store or
outlet and no central warehouse; this argument was rejected. The
court indicated this tax was merely a means of equalizing the tax load
since comparable businesses purchased from wholesalers who paid
the wholesaling tax. Thus this case can be distinguished from the
above mentioned cases where there was no tax on other identical busi-
nesses using a different form of organization; the taxes there created
inequality while this tax attempted to eliminate it.
In the case of State v. Inland Empire Refineries99 the court held
93 State v. Inland Empire Refineries, Inc., 3 Wn.2d 651, 101 P.2d 975 (1940).
94 Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U.S. 122 (1920).
95 Texas Co. v. Cohn, note 90 supra.
9 6 Aberdeen Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Chase, 157 Wash. 351, 289 Pac. 536 (1930), 71
A.L.R. 232; Burr, Conrad & Brown v. Chase, 157 Wash. 393, 289 Pac. 551 (1930)
(Both cases involved excise taxes on certain type businesses operating by a corporate
form, but where there were no taxes on the same type businesses operating as a part-
nership or individual proporietorship) ; State v. Dencker, 58 Wash. 501, 108 Pac.
1086 (1910); see also Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, note 91 supra, where
the Court held that special taxation of cab companies using the corporate form com-
bined with no taxation of such companies using some other form violated the equal
protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
97 Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. City of Seattle, note 92 supra, 291 U.S. at
624, Justice Stone said, ".... equal protection does not require a city to abstain from
taxing the business of a corporation organized for profit merely because in the public
interest the municipality has acquired like property or conducts a like business."
98 187 Wash. 472, 60 P.2d 86 (1936).
99 3 Wn.2d 651, 101 P.2d 975 (1940).
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that it was unreasonable to classify various types of fuel dealers-
fuel oil, coal, wood-and then tax only one. This decision was over-
ruled by Texas Co. v. Coln'°° where on identical facts the classification
was upheld. The court discussed the differences between the products
sold by the different businesses, emphasizing the physical distinctions
of the different products. This is in line with the United State Supreme
Court case of Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co.'0° where the court up-
held the different classification of anthracite coal and bituminous coal
because of the physical difference and different uses. Physical differ-
ences were the grounds for upholding, in respect to the equal protection
clause, the highly discriminatory tax placed on oleomargarine but not
butter by the Washington legislature. °2
The Washington court has tended to uphold classifications by the
legislature, as a study of the cases reveals. The following statement
from Brown-Froman Co. v. Kentucky... is often quoted by the Wash-
ington court:0 4
A very wide discretion must be conceded to the legislative power of
the state in the classification of trades, callings, businesses or occupa-
tions which may be subjected to special forms of regulation or taxa-
tion through an excise or license tax....
It is not the function of this Court in cases like the present to con-
sider the propriety or justness of the tax, to seek for the motives or to
criticize the policy which prompted the adoption of the legislation.
Our duty is to sustain the classification adopted by the legislature if
there are substantial differences between the occupations separately
classified. Such differences need not be great....o
There are other more minor classification problems of interest. It
is unreasonable to give tax credit to businesses that are on a fiscal year
basis but not those on a calendar year basis?'6 A state can not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce by classification, but this is
because of the commerce clause and not the equal protection clause. 0
100 8 Wn.2d 360, 112 P.2d 522 (1941).
101 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
102 A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
103217 U.S. 563 (1910).
'
0 4 Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. City of Seattle, 172 Wash. 668, 21 P2d
727, aff'd 291 U.S. 619 (1934); Benjamin Franklin Thrift Stores v. Henneford, 187
Wash. 472, 60 P.2d 86 (1936); Supply Laundry Co. v. Jenner, note 85 supra; Texas
Co. v. Cohn, note 90 supra.
10 Compare this statement with Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, note 91
supra.
101 Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wn2d 191, 235 P.2d 173 (1951).
107 Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939); Columbia Steel Co.
v. State, 30 Wn.2d 658, 192 P2d 976 (1948).
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In the Columbia Steel Co., case" s the legislature had provided that
persons taxable as manufacturers should not be taxed as wholesalers
on sale of the manufactured goods. The court held this to be a dis-
crimination against interstate commerce in that it levied a tax upon
the wholesale activities of those engaged in such commerce while ex-
empting those performing the same activities if the goods were manu-
factured in this state. The legislature then amended the statute to
provide that if a person were taxed as a wholesaler, he was not to be
taxed as a manufacturer. This was held in B. F. Goodrich Co. v.
State 9 to be a good way of eliminating any claim of discrimination
against interstate commerce since all wholesalers were taxed equally
and obviously no out-of-state manufacturer could complain of Wash-
ington not taxing its manufacturers in certain situations.
Another classification problem of a different nature arises under a
peculiarity of the Washington statute. The statute classifies all busi-
nesses by type and taxes at various rates: extractors, 4 of 1%; 10
manufacturers, 4 of 1%o;'11 retailers, Y4 of 1% ;112 a buyer and
wholesale seller of certain grains, 1/100 of 1%;' manufacturers of
wheat into flour, 8 of 1%;"14 wholesalers and distributors, 4 of
1% ;... printers, publishers, highway contractors, extractors or pro-
cessors for hire, and operators of cold storage warehouses, Y4 of 1 ; .16
and all other business or service activities not covered by any other
section 2 of 1 %.117
The first problem is deciding into which category a certain business
falls. The relevant statutes, RCW 82.04.010 to 82.04.210, define the
various categories and terms. The statutes as well as the Excise Tax
Rules of the Tax Commission reflect in some degree court decisions
made over the years or modifications of court decisions; 11 a study of
the cases in this area is of limited use since they concern the construc-
lo8 See note 107 supra.






115 Wash. Ex. Sess. Laws 1959 c. 5 § 3 (RCW 82.04.270).
116 Wash. Ex. Sess. Laws 1959 c. 5 § 4 (RCW 82.04.280).
117 Wash. Ex. Sess. Laws 1959 c. 5 § 5 (RCW 82.04.290).
318 In Buffelen Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. State, 32 Wn.2d 40, 200 P.2d 497 (1948),
the Tax Commission attempted to tax the value of a waste product which the company
used as fuel. The court refused to allow the tax, interpreting "manufacturer" as not
including waste products since the purpose of the business was not the production of
waste products. Subsequently the legislature amended the statute and specifically
included these products.
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tion of the then current statute. For example, the present statute broad-
ly defines "to manufacture" as embracing activities of a commercial or
industrial nature where labor or skill is applied to materials so that a
new, different or useful substance of tangible personal property is
produced for sale or commercial or industrial use."9 In J. & J. Dunbar
Co. v. State"° the company bought in bulk unprocessed, unusable
whiskey and stored it in bonded warehouses to age. It contracted with
another company to remove the whiskey from the barrels, filter out
the charcoal, and bottle the whiskey. The company was held taxable
as a manufacturer within the meaning of the statute which is basically
the same as set out above.' It should be noted from this case that all
the acts necessary to complete an article into a finished product do
not have to be accomplished directly by the person taxed. In fact, in
this case the taxpayer did very little other than control the situation;
the actual processing and aging were done by others.
There seems to be little problem with any other category. This is
probably because of the extensive statutory definitions and also be-
cause the rates are the same in the majority of important classifica-
tions; this latter situation removes much of the impetus for litigation.'
RCW 82.04.440 provides that every person engaged in activities
within the purview of RCW 82.04.230 to 82.04.290 inclusive (extract-
ing, manufacturing, etc.) shall be taxable under each paragraph ap-
plicable but that persons taxable as retailers or wholesalers shall not
be taxable as extractors or manufacturers with respect to the extracted
or manufactured products sold; and that persons taxable as manu-
facturers shall not be taxable as extractors with respect to the ingredi-
ents of the products so manufactured. The purpose of this action seems
to be to provide for as equitable an imposition of actual tax liability
as possible so far as the business and occupation tax is concerned.
An interesting problem concerning this section arose in Crown Zeller-
back v. State; a case in which the company qualified as an extractor,
manufacturer, and also a wholesaler. The Tax Commission attempted
to tax the company, not as a wholesaler, but as a manufacturer, despite
"19 Wash. Ex. Sess. Laws 1959 c. 3 § 2 (RCW 82.04.120).
12040 Wn.2d 763, 245 P.2d 1164 (1952), 108 A.L.R. 1074.
121 See also Stokely-Van Camp v. State, 50 Wn2d 492, 312 P.2d 816 (1957) ; Drury
The Tailor v. Jenner, 12 Wn.2d 508, 122 P.2d 493 (1942) ; C. V. Wilder Co. v. State,
48 Wn.2d 834, 297 P.2d 241 (1956) ; all the cases concern factual questions of what
is a manufacturer; see also, Annot. 116 A.L.R. 1111.
122 The retailer-wholesaler problems are usually raised in regard to the sales tax
as the sales tax statute, Title 82.08 RCW, refers to the definitions used in the business
and occupation tax.
123 45 Wn.2d 749, 278 P.2d 305 (1954).
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the above statute. A large part of the company's wholesale sales were
excludable from gross income because of interstate commerce restric-
tions. The company argued that its sales in interstate commerce were
taxable as wholesale sales under RCW 82.04.270 because that section
did not distinguish between intrastate and interstate sales; but that it
was entitled to a deduction for such sales under RCW 82.04.430(6).
Therefore, the company contended, it should be taxed exclusively as
a wholesaler and not as a manufacturer or extractor. The court re-
jected this argument saying the wholesaling activities were not taxable
under RCW 82.04.270 because of the Federal Constitution and RCW
82.04.430(6) merely acknowledged this fact. The court refused to
hold that the legislature intended extracting and manufacturing to be
exempt from tax if the product were sold wholesale to buyers outside
the state; they felt that what was intended to be exempt from tax were
those sales taxed a second time under the wholesale classification.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The business and occupation tax is extremely broad in its scope and
application. The court has construed most sections of the tax so that
it is well defined and has maintained its vitality. The court has allowed
the legislature broad powers of classification and the legislature has
used this power in such a way that a minimum amount of litigation
has arisen. There are limitations, however, contained both in the act
and in the Washington and United States Constitutions. Except for
the interstate commerce clause, the Federal Constitution has not been
an extensive limiting factor. The Washington constitution has provided
some problems in regard to classification, but most objections here
have been effectively eliminated by the legislature.
Nearly all businesses are covered by the tax. Due to the large
amount of litigation in past years which settled most questions, it is
now extremely difficult to avoid this tax, especially in the case of a
general type of business or group of taxpayers. In particular instances,
certain sales or activities may not be taxed, but these instances largely
depend on the particular facts in light of the Federal Constitution.
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